Book review : Baseball science by Aaron Steelman
T
alent. For some people it’s a
blessing. For others, such as Billy
Beane, it can seem like a curse.
There are few things as sad as
promise gone unfulfilled, and by all
measures Beane was one of the most
promising baseball talents of his gen-
eration. Standing 6 feet 4 inches, with
blazing speed and a quick bat, Beane
was labeled a “can’t-miss” prospect. The 
New York Mets selected the 18-year-old
in the first round












up to this role —
at least for a 
while. He was a
star on the 1986 team that won the
World Series, and had several more
good seasons for the Mets before per-
sonal problems and injuries cut short
his career.
Billy Beane’s career, on the other
hand, never really got off the ground.
He played six mediocre seasons in the
Major Leagues, mostly as a backup,
compiling a career batting average of
just .219.
The can’t-miss prospect proved to be
a bust. Why? Nobody really knew at the
time, including Billy Beane. Maybe he
lacked dedication. Maybe he lacked con-
fidence. Or maybe he just wasn’t as good
as people thought. After all, Beane had
little to recommend him other than raw
talent and gaudy high-school statistics.
He  had never proven himself against
top-notch competition before the Mets
spent a first-round pick on him.
Unlike another talented young
slugger from the San Diego area, Mark
McGwire, Beane hadn’t played college
baseball. McGwire, in contrast, already
had three years at the University of South-







just talent, he had
a track record.
One could use a
wide range of 
objective meas-
ures to evaluate 
McGwire, while
with Beane one
had to rely on
subjective meas-
ures. McGwire, of course, would go on
to become one of the most prolific
home-run hitters in baseball history,
while Beane knocked only three
pitches out of the park during his
entire career.
To longtime baseball scouts, though,
subjective measures were paramount.
They believed they could spot a future
star just by looking at him. As long as
a player was fast, strong, and had a
good arm, he could be turned into a
big-leaguer. Billy Beane fit this profile
perfectly. He benefited from the way
scouts judged players. But after his
playing days were over, Beane would
devote his efforts to proving these
Baseball Science
MONEYBALL: THE ART OF
WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME
BY MICHAEL LEWIS





Editor’s Note: Beginning with this
issue, we introduce a book review
department to Region Focus. First
up: Michael Lewis’ Moneyball,
which discusses the economics 
of Major League baseball, an
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strive to make baseball a science — one
where quantifiable, testable measures
prevailed over subjective evaluations.
Moneyball is the story of Beane’s
efforts to implement his theories as
general manager of the Oakland Ath-
letics, more commonly known as the A’s.
Written by Michael Lewis, the book
follows the team during the 2002
season, a year in which Oakland won
the American League West champi-
onship despite having one of the lowest
payrolls in all of baseball. Beane and
his staff, especially his assistant Paul
DePodesta, were able to build a
club that could compete with much
richer opponents, even the hated
New York Yankees, a team that
many fans believed were destroying
the game by buying up the game’s
best players. How did Beane and
his staff do it? Through careful
scouting of amateur players and
shrewd free-agent acquisitions.
Consider the way they
approached the draft. As Beane
could personally attest, many scouts
favored talented high-school
players — young studs, as it were
— over older college players. And
while some of these high-school
players would have fantastic major
league careers — for instance, high
schooler Alex Rodriguez was
selected first overall in the 1993
draft and is now arguably the
game’s best player — many more
would simply fade from the spot-
light. College players were much
safer, if less spectacular, bets. Beane and
his staff toured the country in search
of college players who many teams
simply ignored.
For instance, in 1997 the A’s drafted
right-handed pitcher Tim Hudson.
Although Hudson was the Southeastern
Conference player of the year his senior
season, posting a 15-2 record with the
Auburn Tigers, few teams were inter-
ested in him. The A’s were able to snap
him up in the sixth round. Hudson
became a regular member of Oakland’s
starting rotation in 1999, and since then
has three times finished in the top 10
for the Cy Young Award, given annu-
ally to the league’s top pitcher.
The A’s also have been able to find
bargains in the free-agent market,
including many players that teams were
anxious to discard. These players did
not perform well on certain measures
usually given great weight by baseball
insiders, such as batting average and
stolen bases. But to the A’s, these were
not particularly important statistics. 
Beane and DePodesta were follow-
ers of baseball writer Bill James, who
published his own Baseball Abstract
from 1977 to 1988. James’ data-heavy
books were the products of intense
research and some controversy. His
approach, called “Sabermetrics,”
employed statistical and mathematical
techniques to analyze baseball records.
Early on, James created his own
formula called “Runs Created.” The
idea was to develop a testable hypoth-
esis about what accounted for a team’s
offensive output. The formula went as
follows: Runs Created = (Hits + Walks)
x Total Bases/(At Bats + Walks). 
James tested his formula using
Major League data. If the actual
number of runs scored by a team dif-
fered dramatically from his predicted
number, his model was clearly wrong.
“As it turns out, James was onto some-
thing,” writes Lewis. “His model came
far closer, year in and year out, to
describing the run totals of every big
league baseball team than anything the
teams themselves had come up with.”
According to the Runs Created
formula, the two conventional meas-
ures that contributed most to a team’s
offensive success were on-base per-
centage and slugging percentage. If a
guy could get on base (it didn’t
matter how — getting a hit or
taking a walk both counted) or hit
for power, he could help his team
score runs. So James combined the
two statistics to create a new one:
On Base Plus Slugging, known
simply as OPS. Beane and
DePodesta searched for players
with high OPS scores, and found
one in Scott Hatteberg.
Hatteberg, in the view of most
Major League executives, was just an
average player. In a single season,
he had never hit above .277 or driven
in more than 43 runs for his former
team, the Boston Red Sox. Still,
Beane and DePodesta noticed that
he consistently had an OPS score
around .800, thanks in large measure
to a good eye at the plate. Hatteberg
was no star. But he was a solid player
who fit into the Oakland system.
And that was exactly what Oakland
was developing — a system.
Before the 2002 season, the A’s
had lost their best player, Jason Giambi,
to the New York Yankees, who signed
him as a free agent. Beane and
DePodesta knew that they could not
replace Jason Giambi. There were few
players in the league as good — and
those who were carried too high a price
tag. But they could try to replace Jason
Giambi’s numbers by acquiring over-
looked journeymen who would play
their roles as Beane and DePodesta saw
them. Hatteberg was the prototypical
cog in the Oakland machine. The plan
worked perfectly: Even without their
star, the A’s still won 103 games in 2002
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It’s hard to argue with Beane’s ap-
proach. The A’s have performed impres-
sively under his guidance. Since 2000,
they have compiled a win-loss record of
392-255, and have gone to the playoffs
every year. But some questions remain.
First, why do the A’s seem unable to
win the big game? The A’s make it to
the playoffs year after year but fail to
advance to the World Series. Could
there, in fact, be some “intangibles”
necessary to get a team over the hump?
For instance, are there, in fact, “clutch
players,” guys who have an uncanny
ability to deliver when the stakes are
high? If so, Beane and his staff would
not be well prepared to identify such
players since their contribu-
tions are, by definition,
erratic and hard to predict.
Also, might the proverbial
“character guys” — players
who lead the team in the
clubhouse instead of on the
field — be a key ingredient
for a championship team?
Again, if this is true, the A’s
would be likely to overlook
them since their real value
doesn’t show up in a statisti-
cal formula.
Second, if Beane’s approach
is so good, why haven’t other teams
adopted it? Part of the explanation may
be simple inertia. Baseball, more than
any other sport, is tradition-bound. Old
habits — and prejudices — die hard.
Other general managers may look at the
A’s and simply think that their recent
success has been a fluke. In their minds,
the traditional way of running a baseball
team — from judging talent to managing
a budget — has worked for generations
(even if it really hasn’t) and with time
will be proven superior to Beane’s
unorthodox methods. 
To  some extent, other teams are
adopting Beane’s approach. For instance,
at the end of the 2002 season the
Boston Red Sox named 28-year-old
Theo Epstein as the team’s general
manager. Epstein first discovered Bill
James’ writings in the fourth grade and
hired the Sabermetrics guru as a team
consultant. J. P. Ricciardi, who worked
closely with Beane in Oakland, was
hired by the Toronto Blue Jays in
November 2001 to run that team’s front
office. The Toronto management was
impressed by what the cash-strapped A’s
were able to accomplish and hoped that
Ricciardi could bring similar success
north of the border. And before the
2004 season DePodesta was lured away
from Oakland to become the general
manager of the Los Angeles Dodgers.
Third, why haven’t Beane’s methods
been applied to other sports? The pres-
sure to win in professional basketball,
for instance, is equally intense. If a
more scientific approach would help a
team win games, one would think that
coaches and general managers would
move — however gradually — to adopt
it. Yet, if anything, we are seeing the
opposite occur. Teams are increasingly
basing their draft selections on talent
and less on measurable performance.
For instance, the number of high-
school players being picked has sky-
rocketed, while it has become fairly
rare to see a college senior chosen with
a high pick. 
Perhaps this has to do with the dif-
fering nature of the two games. In
baseball there is a lot of one-on-one
action. In a battle between pitcher and
hitter, for instance, it’s pretty easy to
isolate how each player performed. But
in basketball, it’s not so easy. Aguy could
be a 30-point scorer because the offense
is geared to feature him. On another
team he may not look like such a star.
Still, there are some objective measures
— such as free-throw and field-goal
shooting percentages — that could be
used to construct formulas similar to the
ones employed by Beane and his staff.
It’s not clear why this hasn’t been done.
Whatever shortcomings there may
be with Beane’s approach to running a
Major League baseball team — and the
questions above suggest there are some,
arguably minor, issues to be resolved
— there is no doubt that his methods
are interesting. Likewise, Moneyball is a
fascinating read. Lewis has taken a good
story and produced a great book that
will appeal to a broad audience.
For instance, the person who first
recommended  Moneyball to  me has
only a passing interest in America’s
national pastime. Afew years
ago, I took him to a Chicago
Cubs game. He enjoyed
himself. After all, the
bratwursts were tasty and the
weather was good. But the
actions on the field seemed
nonsensical, even chaotic to
him. Why, for example, did
the grounds crew sweep the
infield every three innings? It
would be more reasonable, he
argued, to send them out
there as needed — for
instance, after an especially
long inning in which a lot of runners
reached base. Or why did the manager
have to wear a uniform like the players,
since there was no chance he was going
to enter the game? NBA, NFL, and
NHLcoaches didn’t suit up, and he saw
no good reason why baseball managers
should be any different. To my friend,
baseball relied too much on ritual and
convention — and I think that’s one of
the reasons he liked Moneyball. To him,
it was the story of science and order
being applied to a game that, in his
view, was unscientific and disorderly. 
Of course, to many fans, that’s the
beauty of baseball. It’s a simple game
whose quirks are to be appreciated, not
scorned, a game with an internal logic
all its own. I suspect that those people
will get as much enjoyment from
reading  Moneyball as my friend did,
even if for very different reasons. RF
Oakland was able to build a 
club that could compete with 
much richer opponents, even 
the hated New York Yankees.
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